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The idea of a comparison between pre"1935 Et hiopia with Japan before

.~ and during the Meiji Restoration arouses contradictory reactions a mong students

.j

of Ethiopia. Some find the idea indefensible , others judge it quite reasonab le and
instructive. Those who reject the pa rallel do so by emphas izing the socia l gap
which separated Japan a nd Ethiopia, while t hose who welcome the idea base
their arguments on historical simila rities and on the identity of objectives of
their res pective modernizing circles. Thus , among the first group , Shiferaw Bekele
contests the serious ness of a parallel between Japan a nd Ethiopia , arguing that
the Ethiopian leaders ha d only a superficial knowledge of Japan and its
modernization: "I see it written tha t Japan served as a 'model'. This word is not
helpful because it gives the wrong impression. The knowledge that the so-ca lled
Japa nizers had about J a pa n's westernization was at best elementary ... That
westernization meant tot a l overhaul of state a nd society including its mores and
values, eating hab its, dress a nd lifestyles was not a t a ll realized. Most t hought in
terms of s uperficia l changes.'" Bahru Zewde too, while a dmitting some a na logies,
is of t he opinion that the social and technological gap between the two countries
was so unbridgeable tha t the model of J apan "remained a s ubjective urge
unsupported by the objective reality."2
Among the group of supporters we find Addis Hiwet. He coined t he
concept of 'Jap a nizer' to dis tinguish from "the ultra feudalists- represe nted by
such grand conservatives as Taitu, Habte-Giorgis, a nd Balch-a nd the liberal or
enlighte ned feudalis t s-represented by Tefferi a nd his corpora te group ... ,"3 a third
group, was the group of Japanizers who saw in the transformation of post -Meiji
Japan "a living his torical model for Ethiopia: the liquidation of feud alis m , and
t he development of capitalism through t he agency of the modern s tate-ie a
revolution from a bove."
Why, then, do I bring back so controversial a topic when at best it ca n only
promise t he purs uit of fruitless controvers ies? This is because I believe that much
can be lea rned about the causes of the Ethiopian failure to modernize if the
concept of the J apanese model is t a ken seriously. Its most glaring outcome is to
impute t he failure of Ethiopian modernization more to the lack of political
dete rmination than to the inadequacy of the objective rea lity. Due to a s ubjective
error, t he failure was caused not so much by the inappropriateness of the
objective conditions as by a falt ering political wilL While Japan pursued
syste matically a nd with great determination the necessa ry course of action,
Ethiopia did not. In order to assess the reasons for the Ethiopian lack of
determination, it is first of all necessary to determine with precision the
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conditions for the acceptability of the notion of the Japanese model.

IN WHAT SENSE IS THE NOTION OF JAPANESE MODEL
ACCEPTABLE?
True, as Shiferaw Bekele suggests, serious studies of the Japanese model
were not made by Ethiopian intellectuals. Neither did the Ethiopian leaders show
any determined will to follow the model, aside from superficial reference •.
Nonetheless, despite their shallow knowledge, some Ethiopian intellectuals and
political leaders were amazed by how similar conditions between the two
countries were. Unlike Bahru Zewde's assumption, the similarity of objective
conditions explains why some Ethiopians naturally referred to Japan. The
reference was less the product of a conscious adjustment to a model than the
recognition, almost instinctive, of a common objective legacy.
In other words, if the concept of J apanizer is confined to the tiny circle of
the radical intellectuals who wanted to correct the wrong trend of the evolution of
Ethiopia, it offers little interest. Being a marginal, superficial, and, as we shall
soon see, theoretically and politically ill-advised group, its impact was negligible.
Where the notion of model becomes interesting is when we consider the attempta
made by ruling circles to safeguard Ethiopian independence through reforms and
the appropriation of Western technology. Tewodros and Menelik were
undoubtedly set on this course of thinking. It was not a theoretical movement, but
an option induced by the survival power of traditional Ethiopia. Reforms were
perceived as necessary, even if they were not clearly spelt out. Above all.
European weaponry was perceived as vital for survival. Survival means here the
subsistence of traditional Ethiopia, that is of its religion, values, ruling class and
social structure.

According to me, this theme of survival alone authorizes a serious and
theoretically fruitful parallel between Ethiopia and Japan. Actually, AddiJ
Hiwet's definition of the Japanese model by such changes as liquidation of
feudalism, revolution from above is most misleading. The definition empties the
comparison of all meaning, if only because it is heedless of the fact that, iD
Japan's modernization process, "ethics and social philosophy remained
thoroughly Confucian and thus feudal,"5 and that "the great motive force iD
Japanese modernization was the threat of absorption or destruction by the
West."6 Only when the survival of a traditional elite is admitted to have been the
main motive of Japanese industrialization can the parallel with Ethiopia become
meaningful. The problem deals less with the attitudes of intellectuals than with
the options of a traditional polity when faced with the threat of WesterD
colonialism.
Need we insist on Tewodros's modernizing ethos, especially on how close
his inspiration was to the Meiji Restoration? As summarized by Sven Rubensoo:
"Tewodros perceived as did none of his predecessors among the mesafint that the
political anarchy, moral laxity, and technological backwardness of his people
threatened national survival. The reforms he announced, the policies he tried to
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implement, the very single-mindedness and perseverance with which he tackl d
the problems, indicate that he aimed at nothing less than a national
I
combined with the transformation of his coliI!try into a modern state."7 Tewodr::s
spoke in terms of restoration of the traditional polity, but such that it would
counter the colonial threat. In no way was modernization equated with
Westernization; rather, it was a survival option designed to endow the traditional
polity with new material means. Tewodros's attempts to constitute a standing
army, to introduce a separation between Church and state, to reduce the
landholding of the Church, to institute Amharic as a national language, to build
roads and bridges , and to centralize administration, are inseparable from his
fanatical attachment to traditional Ethiopia, to its religious values, nobility, and
imperial system. The reforms were perceived as necessary to salvage what was
most precious and essential. They were infringements serving the higher cause of
rescue, not views disparaging Ethiopian values and social fabric as rotten and
obsolete, any more than they were meant to replace traditional values by
Western ones. Reforms were sacrifices, flagellations for the purpose of national
revival, such as only higher fIdelity could require. An inner evolution of the
Ethiopian system rather than revolution was contemplated. Most of all,
Tewodros's determination to steal Wes tern technology, as evinced by his attempt
to manufacture firearms in Ethiopia, was an inspiration which was quite
Japanese.
The same spirit has animated Menelik's approach to modernization. He
too wanted to strengthen the state through some centralizing measures and the
construction of roads and networks of communication. He understood the
importance of modern education and opened to that end the first school where the
highest dignitaries were urged to send their sons. He was also "supremely
interested in weapons and generally intrigued with machinery and technology"
with the view of posses sing "for himself and his people the power which resides in
the white man's knowledge of things."B All this was desired for the purpose of
restoring the grandeur of Christian Ethiopia. The nationalistic interpretation of
modernization, and not as is now the case, the desire for Westernization, brought
Ethiopian leaders close to the Japanese path. Incidently, Haile Selassie's
decision to adopt a constitution which "was in many respects a faithful copy of the
Meiji Constitution of 1889,"9 adds an argument to the thesis since, however
Superficial the knowledge of Japan about Ethiopian leaders may have been, it
.. Was enough to inspire them. Haile Selassie's preference for the Meiji constitution,
if properly analyzed, would certainly reveal the choice of a development model
c"ntered on the need to salvage much of the traditional system.
Modernization understood as a way to ensure survival and rescue
tradition is, therefore , the strong point in favor of a parallel between Japan and
. Ethiopia. Even if the means utilized proved different, the same spirit has
. doUbtless inspired both countries. Just as Japan wanted to appropriate Western
-:nnOiclgy to safeguard its independence, values, and social system, so too have
Ethiopian leaders nursed the same goal. It implied the project of modernizing
-··"ULIT. social revolution, in the sense that it should come from above, but also

rev;:
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t ha t it must avoid wrecking t radit ion. I call the Japanese model this project of
modernization without Westernizat ion or, if you will, the enterprise of salvaging
tradition. Modernization is not expected to come from a revolution, from the
overthrow of a class by another cla ss. Nor is it the product of acculturation or
Westernization. It is not an aspiration, but a duty, an obligation to tradi tion.
Focussing on modern weaponry, it is a rescue mission , no more no less.
Let us now turn to the objection according to which t his comparison does
away wit h the chief issue , that is with the fa r-reaching reforms undertook bl'
Japan, whereas no such kind of reformi st policy was ever planned, let a lo n~
applied, in Ethiopia. That is what Marcus notes: though Menelik had heard of
Japan and was stimulated by its example, "he opposed the thoroughgoing
econom ic and social transformation that would be inspired by industrial
revolut ion ."lo Why did Menelik oppose, or at least did not fee l the need for. a
radical transformation while being animated with the sa me spirit? Answering
t his question is knowing why the same goa l opted for divergent courses of
realization. Since structural differences between Japa n and Ethiopia a re beli eved
to have ca used these divergent developm ents, let me unravel the sim il arities
shared by the two countries.
The important point is, of course , that both have escaped colonization.
Seeing t he imputation by mos t schol a rs of underdevelopment to the fact of
coloni zation, the preservation of t heir sovereignty is no small matter. The
possibility of indigenous development being conditional on the maintenance of
independence, the Japane se model could not have been better app ea ling t han 10
Ethiopia. But, for the threat of colonialism to generate the will to modernity. II
past of imperial glory, which creates the fascination and attraction of Weste rn
technology while preserving the attachment to tradition, is necessary. Only then
is the fear of being colonized s urpa ssed by the desire to emerge as t he peer uf
Europea n count ries. It then takes the clear form of restoration of pas t glor;·.
Colonia lis m contests a place previous ly held, a nd industrialization is t he way to
regain t hat place. In this way, the West is as much a threat a s it is a challenge.
This sp irit of challenge and competition renders colonization all t he more
unbearable.
Modernization appears as restora tion, a reinstatement of pa st glory
because, as one scholar declared, t he "bes t way to look forward is by looking
backward",,"11 It is the best way ina sm uch as the future becomes not so much an
aspiration as the duty, the obligation to retrieve one's place. This di alectiC
explains t he contempt for the West and the fascination fo r its technology, both
being but the desire to appropriate the technology in a context of preserving onc's
identity. More than the lack of technology, wha t handicapped most colonized
countries wa s t heir failure to foster ea rly on the ambition to acquire it. Firea rms
were introduced all over t he world before colonial conquest. Yet in most plaC('s
they were used for mercantile purposes and not against those who brought them.
In this regard, a pas t of imperial glory is quick to induce the desire because neW.
efficient weapons do no more than stimulate a traditional leaning towards glory
and expansion.
- 642 -
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Heruy Wolde Sela ssie, the Foreign Minister of Haile Selassie, in his book
written in 1924 E.C. after his official visit to Japan, notes t hat Japan and
Ethiopia have in common uninterrupted and ancient dynastic rules '2 as well as a
sp irit of fierce independence and isolationis m. 13 They also s hare many identica l
values, especially as regards warlike values l ' A sim ilarity is also observed in
their recent history, as both emerged from a state of anarchy caused by the
supremacy of princes over the imperial authority,l5 In both countries, in their
determination to modernize, emperors took the initiative, '6 for instance by
according a new constitution to their people, by s upporting the expansion of
modern education. Summarizing his views, Heruy writes: "in many respects, what
Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia and Emperor Meiji of Japan did is comparable,""
A more detailed account would find a similarity in the mystical a ura of
emperorship in both countries. Granted that the two imperial syste ms were not
totally alike, especially regarding their religious reference, neverthele ss the unity
of the political and the religious endowed in both countries emperors with
unrivalled authority. In both societies, hierarchical authority was the foundation
of the social fabric, even if the Ethiopian class system never reached the
solidification of a feudal society. Likewise, a traditional type of nationalis m,
predating colonialism and ce ntered on the defense of faith and socia l system , was
the active and permanent drive of the political organization, The perception of a
sim ilarity in past history a nd in the defiant attitude to t he West wa s not
confined to Ethiopian and Japanese circles. It was felt in Europe, especially after
the victory of Adwa. Hess quotes a Paris journa l, La libert, which, after the
victory, wrote: "All European countries will be ob liged to make a place for this
new brother who steps forth ready to play in the dark continent the role of Japan
in t he Far East." 18
My eagerness to highlight affinities will certai nly not convince those
scholars who remain skeptics, inclined as they are to consider such similarities
ins ignificant in comparison with the differences. The striking difference is, of
course, the social and technological gap existing between Japan and Ethiopia.
"Even before the Meiji restoration," reminds Bahru Zewde , "Jap an had attained a
higher stage of social development than Ethiopia in t he twentieth century," 19
Before the restoration, agriculture was in the process of being commercialized,
a nd urbanization, with a fast-growing merchant class, was already on the move.
The parcellization of power inherent in Japanese feudali sm better favored
modern political developments than the Ethiopian system. Put otherwise, very
much like European countries, Jap anese society possessed the necessary
prerequisite s for a successful transition to capitalis m, Such conditions were not
visible in Ethiopia so that, unsupported by objective forces, the attempt to
imitate Japan was anything but feasible .
Perhaps the strongest argument is the one pointing to imponderable
differences in the very process of modernization of the two countries. Whatever
the similarities and differences they shared, Japan was rapidly involved in a
thorough social transformation while Ethiopia barely went beyond measures of
centralization. By causing a deep social change, particularly the destruction of the
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feudal order, Japan's radical meas ures accelerated the development of nati
capitalis m. Et hiopia shrank from altering the social system: apart fro""
measures aiming at strengthening the state through greater centralization,
reforms of Tewodros, Menelik, a nd even Haile Selassie have purposely avoided
radical social changes. The inadequacy of the system to capitalist penetration
t hus maintained, modernization was condemned to be ill-sorted and superficial.
Nothing, then, demons trates better the incomparability of the two countries than
t he attitude of t heir respective leadership to modernity. Despite thpir
nationalism and t he t hreat of colonia lism , Ethiop ia n lea ders never acted as
radically and consiste ntly as t heir Japanese counterparts.
Insofar as this radical objection puts subjective factors above objecti\~.
conditions, it posits the problem in the only way it can receive a satis fa ctory
a nswer. For in clinging to the idea of the inappropriateness of Ethiopia n obj ectiv~
condit ions to the growth of capitalis m , scholars absolve Ethiopian leaders. Worse.
they deprive t hemselves of the opportunity of understa nding the reasons which
are s till hampering the moderni zation of Ethiopia. Because the sa me proble ms
persist, albeit in a different form, t hey produce the sa me effect: t he delay of
modernization. A better approach is gained if we imply that, given the necessa ry
determination, Ethiopian leaders would have certainly s ucceeded in making t he·
required reforms, thus removing the persistent problems. This possibility ca nnot
be excluded, in t he light of the vividness with which foreign t hreats were
disce rned . As happened in Jap a n, the will to reform should have sprung from the
need to salvage tradition, comprising among other things t he class position and
interests of t he ruling elite itself. So the question is: What melted the
determination of Ethiopian leaders? Specifically, why was the sense of threat
changed into confidence , advising the postponement of reforms?

t{;

THE SOUTHERN MARCH AND THE DIVERGENT EVOLUTION
OF ETHIOPIA
According to me, the southern conquest is the main reason for the
softening of t he reformist determina tion. It gave confidence to the ruling elite.
particularly a fter the victory of Adwa. It instilled in "Ethiopians a fal se se nse of
self-s ufficiency and ill-prepared them for the greater danger of the 1930's."'"
Marcus is even more specific: "The ease wit h which Menelik ha d obtained
weapons led Ethiopians to conclude that the nation would always be able to
purchase wa r s upplies from eager salesmen. The lea dership did not consider it
necessary to build up an arm industry, with all the modernization and
reorganization of society that such an effort would involve, but was content to
fos ter the development of government and the tra ditional economy through the
introduction of communications s uch a s the railway, telephone, and telegraph.""
Even if Haile Selassie had other reasons for deferring radical reforms, in the
main he followed t he same reasoning.
Without entering into t he complicated question of the real meaning of the
southern expansion, we can confidently underline its anti-colonial spirit.
- 644-
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Designed to increase substantially the defensive power of the traditional polity,
the southern expansion was indeed effective in discouraging, even in defeating
colonial designs. That said, there is the other side of the conquest: the
overconfidence of the ruling elite, leading to the deferment of necessary reforms.
With respect to the resolution of Ethiopian leaders to stand out against
colonial powers, however, one question deserves serious consideration: Were
Ethiopian leaders as fearful of the colonial danger as Japanese leaders were? Not
that they were not conscious of the threat as such, but rather it took them some
time to conceptualize it. Even once conceptualized, it was mitigated by cultural
proximity. Ethiopia being a besieged Christian country, the first reaction of
Ethiopian leaders has been to consider Europeans as allies. Tewodros thought so
and openly expressed "the hope that Britain would help him to modernize his
country."22 Christianity created such a cultural affinity between Europe and
Ethiopia that the Ethiopian elite was inclined to think that, rather than
colonizing Ethiopia, colonial powers would want to help it modernize. Menelik too
had difficulty in understanding why Italy would desire to colonize a Christian
country. Some such consideration never crossed the minds of Japanese leaders .
The cultural estrangement between Japan and Europe was too great to allow
anything other than a stubborn and resolute defense of identity.
This argument will not take us very far, however. Though cultural
estrangement was universal in the colonial world, the Japanese response was
unique. Moreover, Ethiopian leaders were promptly awakened to the illusion of
alliance by the inexorable logic of colonial conquest. Even if the cultural closeness
may have lured them for a while, it did not fool them. So the harder the
awakening, the stronger should have been the resolution to modernize in order to
counter the colonial threat .
This brings us back to the southern conquest. It is the main cause for the
retardation of Ethiopia: the so-called social and technological advance of Japan
can hardly be a sufficient reason. China was at a level of social development
comparable to Japan; it too suffered humiliations caused by Western powers and
fostered a similar urge to emancipation. In spite of these coinciding conditions ,
China did not follow the Japanese path. Reproducing the Ethiopian experience, it
even slipped into underdevelopment. So, the political will is as much decisive as ,
if not more decisive than the social stage. The important issue is to know why and
how the will was prevented from adopting a radical course of action.
The paradox of Japanese modernization is that a consen-ative class
introduced radical changes for a no less consen-ative purpose , to wit the
preserva tion ofthe traditional ideology and system of power. In fact, all the social
transformation was inspired by one basic aim: the production of modern
weaponry. The more we wonder how a consen-ative class could so behave, the
clearer becomes the absence of other options. More exactly, the survival ethos of
the ruling class could rely on no other option to achieve its goal than to initiate
reforms which, however untraditional and detrimental to the ruling elite , were
necessary to save what could and deserved to be saved. They were proper
sacrifices for the purpose of rescuing the essential goal. Had Japanese rulers
- 645-
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other opt ions, s uch as the conquest of n ew territories, or the prospect of new
resources, a llowing them the purchase of firearms , they too would have probably
s hunned t he antagonizing reforms. This does not mean that the Japanese elite
was s imply driven by the absence of choice. The case of China s howed the
exist ence of a nother option as well as the irreplaceability of human decision and
willingness to accept sacrifices . Japanese lea ders opted for the most difficult but
in the long run, for the most rewarding course . Herein lies their unique merit.
.
Ethiopian rulers were also confronted with various choices. Natura ll\"
t hey chose the easiest way, the one with the least change and sacrifice. Th~
condition for survival being the upgra ding of military capability, given additional
resources, the hard way of manufa cturing modern weapons , with t he atte ndant
far-reaching social changes, could be excha nged for the much more benign course
of purchasing weapons. The case of Tewodros provides enough evidence of thi,
imprudence. Beca use Tewodros could see no other way out of the danger than by
t he manufacture of firearms , he was driven towards the Japanese logic. Still
alien to the idea of expanding the empire in order to muster additional peoples
and resources, he was , so to speak, cornered within the limits of tradit ional
Ethiopia from which he could hardly s queeze more s urplus to buy weapons. Given
the s ituation, what else could he do but to increase production? And thi s policy
would mea n reform s and t he int roduction of new methods, in a word resolute
moderni zation .
Tewodros failed, at any rate did not have t he necessary time to nurture
and launch the proj ect . His irascible cha ract er, so little inclined to compromises
and concess ions, his precipitation, a nd his intolerance of Islam and the Oromo.
partially explain his failure. Characteristically, the need for more surplus led him
to exprop ri ate land from the Church whose antagonis m is believed to have b(>cn
an important reason for his downfall. Still , the persistence of the danger and till'
absence of credible alt.ernatives would ha ve coerced Ethiopian leaders int o
admitting the need for reform s . To a ll of them, induding t he Church, t h,'
dependence of their power a nd influence on t he s urviva l of Ethiopian
independence would have, willy-nilly, become imperative.
Precisely, this evolution was totally obstructed by the southern conquest.
The problem of obtaining more s urplus to purchase firearms being solved , beyond
hope, by the immense prospects of the southern march, there wa s no rea son for
change, no need for reform s. Rapid Ethiopianization and Chris tianization of the
so ut hern populations accompanied by the creation of a southern elite embedded
in the state were all that was needed to ma ke additional peoples and resources
ava il ab le to the Ethiopian state and ruling elite. The traditional tax rights on
la nd and the sell abroad of exportable products were enough to purchase a
sufficient amount of modern weapons.
The choice of expansion rather than industrialization in the fa ce of
colonia l threat differentiates, therefore , Ethiopia from Japan. The Ethiopian
option was most natural and predictable. Conquest wa s in the very logic of the
traditional system. As a revival a nd exa ltation of its warlike values, it wa s liable
to seduce t raditional lords. Most of all, conquest ha d the incomparable advantage
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of not requiring change a nd reforms, Only the absence of any other alternative
would have compelled the Ethiopian ruling elite to generate more surp lus
internally, And s uch a course would h ave been mos t arduous a nd unnatural. All
the more reason for neve r t a king t his course was the victory of Adwa in which
E t hiopia n leader s found the ultim ate validation of their option ,
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Granted that the southern expansion stopped colonial advances, the fact
rema ins that it did not remove the threa t a ltogeth er, As would be proven by the
Italian invasion of 1935, the solutio n had obvious li mitations, The purchase of
firearms could not cope with a more organ i zed and highly equipped modern army .
How then do we account for the conti nuous postponement of modernization,
despite increas ing threa t to Ethiopian indepe ndence, during t he rise a nd
consolidation of Haile Selassie's regime? Haile Selassie knew that "as far back
as 1925, Mussolini was making t h e initia l plan for the conqu est of Ethiopia .. "Zl
What if, by t he time Ha ile Selassie r ose to power, all the Ethiop ian
potential for modernization, all its J apa nese ch a racte rs had melted like the
snow? If so, even if the Ethiopian leadership was aware of the dange r, it wa s too
late : the path of change and reform was defi nitively blocked, The main reason
was no longer overconfidence, but a negative structural change due partly to the
incorpora tion of the south, partly to the circumstances related to t he rise of Haile
8elas s ie, I will defme this negative deve lopment by the rise of autocracy, better
still by the identification of m odernization with a utocracy,
Marcus sit uates the prem ises of this evolution just afte r the victory of
Ad wa, Menelik's "tendency towards autocracy became more pronounced after
1896. Whereas previously he had rarely made decisions without the advice of his
major makwanent, after the Battle of Adwa he acted independently, He alone
wa s the Ethiopian state."24 To be sure , the prestige of the victory as well as the
important resources of the south mad e t he state , i-e . the imp eri a l throne
increasingly independe nt and self-reliant. Neithe r regional lords, nor other
t raditionall y admitted form s of p ower devolution could counte rbalance the
a uthority of t he ce ntral governm ent, By m e ans of slow but cum ula ti ve
centralizing m easures, regiona lis m , a nd with it the Ethiopian nobility, were
progressively undermined_ We thus arrive at t he real , st ructura l ca use of the
Ethiopia n failure to modernize: t he progressive m argin alization of the nobility,
The great ob session of Ethiopian e mperors since the end of the Era of t he
Princes , with maybe the exception of Yohannes, has been ce nt r a lism, The
esse ntial target of the 'modernizing' reforms unde rtaken by Tewodros , Menelik,
and especially Haile 8elassie , ha s b een the strengthening of the centr al
government to the detriment of regional power, While this evolution was
understa nd ab le both from the viewpoints of avoiding relapse into the a na rchy of
the Era of the Princes and of preparing the ground for moderniza tio n , it has
nevertheless generated, contrary to the traditional order, a grave imbalance of
power in favor of the monarchy, 8ure enough, centralization is necessary for
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modernization. but not autocracy which. instead. turns into an obstacle to
modernity.
Among the scholars who discussed the reasons for the failure of Ethiopia
to follow the Japanese path. Kifle 8elassie Beseat is of the opinion that "t he
explanation lies largely in the sequence of historical events ... and not in an\"
cultural or human factor that might predetermine the failure .... "25 Convinced ths·t
Menelik "followed a bold policy of modernization from 1889 to 1913. as did his
contemporary in Japan. Emperor Meiji-Tenno .... "26 Kifle 8elassie Beseat
somewhat contradicting his thesis. picks out as a major ccmplicating factor t he
conservatism of the two main religions of Ethiopia. Christianity and Islam. He
also underlines the absence of political stability: "Whereas Japan has had only
three emperors (including Hiro-Hito) since 1868. succeeding one another
peacefully on the throne. in Ethiopia. between the death of Tewodros II in 1868
and the abolition of the monarchy in 1975. seven emperors had ascended the
throne. following an armed struggle in each case."27 The third and most imp orta nt
factor is the unwillingness of Ethiopian leaders to apply radical reform s. In the
words of Kifle 8elassie Beseat: "whereas the Japanese monarchy accepted "
modern parliamentary-type Constitution as early as 1889. the s ucces8 ivc
emperors of Ethiopia never displayed the political acumen to do so. thereby
hastening their own downfall and. what is more . preventing the country from
becoming really modernized."28
Marcus too. in addition to emphasizing the lack of radical reform s on the
pa rt of Ethiopian leaders. attempts to detect the factors which prevented them
from adopting a radical approach. As he himself says: "The Ethiopian people were
not so disciplined as the Japanese; the empire was newly established and i"
admi ni stration still rudimentary. Capital resources were limited. and there were
relatively few skilled and educated Ethiopians who played a significant role in
political and economic life."29 Interestingly. Marcus adds the capacity of the
empire to maintain the status of the wa rrior class so that "there wa s no
structura l danger from an impoverished warrior class. such as had developed in
Japan."JO This is indeed an important reason. given the widespread thesi'
according to w!rich the decline of the Samurai and the resulting withdrawal of
status respect 31 are responsible for their conversion into a capitalist class. If
anyt!ring. by creating the possibility of maintaining the warrior cla ss. the
southern expansion has averted the dissatisfaction. and hence the change of the
Ethiopian nobility.
All these reasons overlap and their ccntribution was not negligible. Still.
there was no obstacle that a determined will to reform cculd not have overcome.
80 that . as suggested by the quoted authors themselves. the great difference
between Japan and Ethiopia was the low degree of ccmmitment. compared to the
Jap a nese leadership. of Et!riopian leaders to radical reforms. And if we ask the
question of knowing what weakened their determination. the answer is the sa me :
the southern conquest. More than social retardation. political instability. lack of
educated elite and capital. the absence of reasons pressing Ethiopian leaders to
realize reforms explains the postponement of radical modernizing meas ures .
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Surely, no one changes unless there is reason for doing so.
From the southern conquest also grew the premises of imperial autocracy.
By providing fresh and important human and material resources for the defense
of Ethiopia, the southern conquest could not but encourage the abnormal,
tentacular growth of the central government, thus paving the way for autocracy.
The inevitability of this evolution becomes evident if only we refer to the
traditional conflict between centripetal and centrifugal forces. When modem
means tend to promote a traditional longing, they are certainly adopted all the
faster. Such was the frame of mind of Haile Selassie. Greater resources, modern
means of centralization, copied from and supported by the West, enabled Haile
Selassie, with the help of a relatively educated group, first to tip the balance in
favor of the throne, then to breakdown the power of the nobility. A perfectly
autocratic system was thus born, all the more defiant as it boasted about its
modernizing mission in the face of the reactionary position of the nobility.
In effect. most scholars situate the divergence between Japan and
Ethiopia in the question of state power. While the Meiji constitution provided the
Japanese monarchy with a modern parliamentary system, no such trend was
perceptible in Ethiopia. This omission was the more significant since Haile
Selassie's constitution was a faithful copy of the Meiji constitution, except on "the
question of civic liberties and the power of the emperor vis-a.-vis the legislative
body."·12 Whereas the Japanese political system increasingly tended to turn the
emperor into a mythical figure, the Ethiopian system went in the opposite
direction by concentrating all executive, legislative, and judicial powers on the
monarch. This evolution is accountable in terms of political will and choice rather
than in terms of social and cultural gaps.
Addis Hiwet's classification opposing the ultra-conservative class of the
nobility to the relatively progressive camp of Haile Selassie should therefore be
revised. Some scholars go even so far as to describe Haile SelassieOs group as a
radical progressive camp, thereby implying that the conflict between Haile
Selassie and the nobility was none other than the struggle between modernism
and conservatism. The opposition to the rise of Haile Selassie was surely
inspired by traditional ideas, but in no way does it follow that these ideas were
reactionary. How could they be so when they aimed at preserving the traditional
balance of power between the throne and the aristocracy. Speaking of Balcha, the
notorious leader of the camp opposed to Haile Selassie, an author writes:
"Characterized often as a reactionary xenophobe, Balcha, as a Teferi antagonist,
was a pious Orthodox Christian convert of Gurage origin, an excellent
administrator and soldier, and an Ethiopian nationalist who at heart felt his
Opponent was selling the country to foreigners."31
For Ethiopia to develop a parliamentary system, the first condition was
doubtless the preservation of the traditional structure of power. A modem
parliamentary system could easily grow from the traditional balance of power
between the imperial throne and the aristocracy. Modern democratic ideas could
take root in Ethiopia only if they could lean on traditional practices instead of
being merely hurled from outside. But with the progressive marginalization of the
-649-
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nobility and the growing strength of the monarchy, the possibility of introducing
in the constitution clauses on civil liberties and power s haring was irremediab!\'
jeopardized.
.
What was highly abnormal in Ethiopia was the complete withdrawal of
the nobility from the process of modernization. In Japan, the split of the
aristocracy between a conservative sector and a modernizing camp was the proof
that a significant sector of the aristocracy was actively involved in the process of
modernization. No s uch split occurred in Ethiopia: t he entire aristocracy wa ,
lab elled as conservative and reactionary, whereas Haile Selassie and hi,
careerists were considered progressists. So general a characterization smacks of
manipulation. The conservatism of the a ristocracy was not negative either, sinCl'
conservatism changing into nationalism would have rather compelled the cla ss to
accept reform s. No, the dema rcation wa s a manner of justifying Haile Selass ieOs
determination to marginalize the nobility in order to realize his autocratic
design.
The proj ect of keeping the Ethiopian nobility out of the process of
modernization has , therefore , split away the Ethiopian option from the Japane,e
model. The J apanese path was designed to salva ge the traditional system, a nd
thus to preserve the ruling elite, from the higher aristocracy to the lower Samurai.
This meant two things: the transformation ofthe traditional values of the ruling
elite into a capitalist drive and the assumption by the same class of the
leadership of modernization. The opposite took place in Ethiopia. Far from being
transformed, the nobility, increasingly considered as an incorrigible reactionary
class, was stripped of its power so that it sank into oblivion. State servant'.
educated or otherwise, anyhow devoted to Haile Selassie, were the hap py
substitutes.
Contrary to the "reforms" of Haile Selassie, changes in Japan were meallt
not so much to exclude the nobility as to force its conversion to modern methods
and values. Take the abolition of feudalism. As an author pointed out, "in Japan.
feudals are abolishing feudalism. In so doing, · they are of course changing
themselves into another class."34 Indeed, the loss of income caused by the remov.!
of fe udal rights compelled the feudal class to recover it by using modern methods .
Such was not the intention of Menelik and especially of Haile Selassie, who were
rather distributing land and tax rights to their warlords in the south. This might
appear as a way of showing solidarity with the nobility; in reality, it was blocking
its evolution. And as the state progressively assumed the military and
administrative role devolving traditionally to the nobility, these grants were
insidiously transforming the whole nobility into a parasitic class. Nobles became
absentee landlords , cut off from their power base and having no specific socin!
responsibilities. What other terms than bribe and corruption can express the
right accorded to nobles to appropriate and consume a s urplus in the production
of which they had no the slightest contribution? The image of a parasitic, usele:;s.
blood-sucking class could not have been better mounted. That the practice of
compensating the nobility with undue economic privileges for its political and
administrative erosion led, first to the degeneration of the class , then to the
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downfall of the monarch y itself, should not come as a s urprise .
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